This week the leaders of Hamas and Jihad met with the Iranian tyrant Khamenei, to establish the mythology of Palestine's victory against Israel. They are aware of their wretchedness on the battlefield, compared to their enormous power in public relations. Such a gathering would not have a significance that surpasses the "Thunder from Cairo" of 1967-73 if Israel had declared its victory when the IDF defeated Hamas in the third week of January. According to all logic, the Israeli government should have brought the Palestinian Authority into Gaza after the victory under a strict agreement for the demilitarization of the Strip. Such an agreement could have conditioned the move on the appointment of a governor for the Strip acceptable to Israel. Instead of doing this, the Israeli government unintentionally, and for the sake of Palestinian mythology, built a story about Rafah-Grad. Now all Hamas needs to do to win with the Islamo-Nazi axis the myth of the heroic victory in Rafah is to bring about the death of as many Palestinians as possible when the IDF entered Rafah, and to ensure that Sinwar remains alive for the entire war campaign in the city. The Rafah question further deepens the Gordian Knot between the IDF's victory and the release of the hostages, see the main story today.

By Mati Cohen 

Wars are won with the help of myths. Myths become influential when their central motif is accepted. This is one of the reasons why on January 21 we wrote here that Israel must recognize its victory over Hamas. We wrote about the reasons for such recognition: "Hamas will not be able to return to being the armed, murderous Nazi Islamic organization that it was, not in the strength it has left, not in preparation, and not in the face of a new array of forces that the IDF will place in the south. Regarding its rule in Gaza, Hamas has lost its ability to implement his policy in the Strip." See the central story, issue 131.

It was impossible on January 21 to deny this recognition; In the governmental sense, there was no Hamas in the Strip. In the military sense, the organization could no longer carry out an organized war. The demand to eliminate the organization "with a complete victory" is not a realistic military move, based on political military facts, since these were clear; The demand for total victory was and remains an ideological political move. This move "for total victory" did not create enough opposition in the Israeli public to stop it, because it was based on the psychology of the Israeli mind after October 7, which needed such far-reaching declarations to restore its national security, even if the connection of the move with reality was not perfect.

The ideology behind the Netanyahu government's move was not to allow the Palestinian Authority to enter the Strip, as a continuation of the dream of the extreme right to one day annex the Palestinian territories to Israel; This is the same delusional dream that in January 2023 was behind the attempt to weaken the Supreme Court, in a way that would allow the annexation of the Palestinian territory in the future.

The ideological move has so far brought some bad results to Israel:

One, the distancing of Israel from the American interest that sees the image of the MAZ as part of the global picture. Israel's actions may contradict the American interest, and above all lead to American political behavior that is contrary to the Israeli interest, for example creating a Palestinian state over Israel's head.

the second, refusal to allow the legal representative of the Palestinian people to govern the Strip; A move which, on the one hand, damaged the overwhelming support for Israel in the world, and on the other hand, prevented a strict agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority for the demilitarization of the Strip, and a de facto political approval of the governmental military elimination of Hamas (not a political elimination, which is impossible).

The third, the postponement of the campaign in the north against the Islamo-Nazi axis that set out to destroy Israel on October 7. This postponement could lead to the cancellation of the vital war campaign, and the transfer of Israel's confrontation with the annihilation intentions of the Islamo-Nazi axis to the next Israeli generation. This week's conference in Tehran makes it clear that the extermination intentions remain exactly as they were on October 7.

The development of the myth about Rafah, by the Islamic Nazi organization Hamas. And investing all of Hamas's military effort in hiding Yahya Sinwar, which is essential for the myth. (We previously wrote here about Hamas' double tunnel system, in which the connection between the upper system and the lower system is hidden. In our estimation, Hamas devoted a special effort to a tunnel system that would hide the leadership, including Sinwar, because he understood the importance of the myth in the battlefield)

Entry of foreign forces from Arab countries into the Gaza Strip. Since, in our estimation, the Sunni countries will eventually form in a long process led by Turkey, which longs for the great days of Suleiman the Magnificent with broad public support in Turkey, since this is the case, Israel's current actions will eventually lead to a Turkish presence on Israel's southern border, alongside the Iranian presence on the northern border.