Iran now understands America's power limit and is acting accordingly: It announced over the weekend that the US should improve on the offer it made to it through Qatar. Iranian President Raisi's remarks indicate that the country has no intention of signing the latest US proposal. Iran apparently understands that America mainly wants to drive a wedge between China and Russia, and to drive a wedge between them, America should not run over Iran, but cooperate with it. That is why the United States so desperately needs a nuclear deal; for the sake of a new Middle East, in which Iran will also have a role
So much so that Iran suddenly realizes America's deep intention, until it announces in its press mouthpieces that America needs to work harder for Iran to sign the agreement, and that the warning that Iran must return immediately to the nuclear deal is unfounded since, according to its president, Iran has never left the nuclear deal, and the one who left the agreement is the United States.
Iran also understands Israel's limitations, and as the Israeli military maneuver is delayed, Iran is apparently convinced that Israel is not prepared for the consequences of a military attack on its part. Because of the distance, and because of the limited ability to use all its military power, which would have been sufficient if the two countries had a common border, but it is probably not sufficient in the logistical sense in the current conditions. A missile war, which Lebanon and the Palestinians could join, and which neither side has enough power to end, is probably a bad option not only for Iran, but also for the Israeli defense establishment. The impression in Israel, on the other hand, is that the public, in contrast to the security establishment, is prepared for this scenario, and is not afraid of it.
For all the above reasons and circumstances, it appears that Iran's approach to the development of nuclear weapons may continue. And that Israel's policy toward Iran over the past two decades has proved to be a failed, even negligent, policy. This policy is one of the factors that challenged and motivated Iran to acquire nuclear weapons (it is possible that foreign publications regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel's was another motivating factor).
Israelis will have to attribute Iranian behavior toward Israel to Israeli behavior toward Iran, while offsetting international factors into Iran's nuclear policy: It is very possible that Iran also wants nuclear weapons in order to be a party to a nuclear balance in an arena where Europe and the United States are present. While Israel does not really have the end stated in its own policy, that is, the military maneuver, while the view of Iran has so far been solely through rifle intent, without any attempt to talk to it, the policy reflected from both opposites may become clear as retroactively failing. Such a policy whose results could have been predicted in advance. All of this may of course change if the IDF clarifies what it has clarified more than once in the past: that it can also do the impossible, and to inflict a military blow on Iran that will stop for generations the threats of Iran's destruction against Israel.
But if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a state commission of inquiry will be required in Israel even more than was required after the Yom Kippur War The Agranat Commission. Benjamin Netanyahu, who conceived and maintained the militant policy toward Iran, will be the main star of this commission of inquiry. The Lapid Bennett government, which adopted Netanyahu's policy without sufficient consideration, will probably also come up for discussion.