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22.09.20248

עיתון בין אויבים

A newspaper among enemies

Investigation of the failure image on Saturday, October 7

  1. The Chief of Staff, in coordination with the Operations Division, demanded from the government 18 battalions to secure the border with Gaza "to prevent a raid"; in the middle of 2023, Prime Minister Netanyahu responded to Major General Herzi Halevi and said: The Intelligence Division tells me that if there is a raid, it will consist of a handful of terrorists , so you don't need 18 battalions.
  2. Why weren't forces sent to the Gaza Strip on October 7 when the attack became known? In the Netanyahu-Halevi consultation, it was decided that the forces would remain on standby in case Hezbollah attacks in the north.
  3. Why was the Air Force not launched to thwart the Hamas raid? Because the Air Force was following the "silence" procedure that became a tradition every year during Passover and Sukkot: a concentrated vacation for everyone. The IDF's airports were empty. And the few that remained were enslaved to the north as mentioned.

In addition to these failures which we bring today, we will mention the exclusive investigation that we published here on October 15, 2023, it is the investigation of the female observers that was published after us in Israel and around the world, according to which the female observers returned and reported to the intelligence for many months before the Iron Swords War, About Hamas movements near the fence, about organizing and training, but the intelligence replied to them: It's fine, calm down. We also reported exclusively after the observation investigation, that the desert patrol battalion, which could have thwarted the Hamas attack, went on a concentrated vacation two days before the attack, on Thursday, October 5. This vacation of the desert patrol battalion is now reminiscent of the silence procedure, in which the entire Air Force was on a concentrated vacation on October 7, a procedure that was even announced to the public by the IDF; The few who remained at the airports were designated in the conversation between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff for intervention in the north in case the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah do enter the war.

By Meir Gurno and Mati Cohen

At a time we do not know, the Chief of Staff contacted the Prime Minister (we do not know if this is during the time of Herzi Halevi or during the time of Aviv Kochavi, and therefore we do not know who was the Prime Minister at the time); the Chief of Staff quoted to the Prime Minister a military analysis by the Operations Division, according to which 18 battalions are required To secure the fence and the settlements on the Gaza border. In accordance with this analysis by AGM, the Chief of Staff demanded from the Prime Minister that the Israeli government provide the IDF with a special budget for the mobilization of 18 battalions for the security of the surrounding area and the settlements. We know that it was Prime Minister Netanyahu who responded to the Chief of Staff's request, apparently after Major General Herzi Halevi had already assumed his post and requested an update from Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding the handling of the IDF's request. Prime Minister Netanyahu replied to Major General Herzi Halevi that the Intelligence Division (AMN) told him that a broad attack on the Gaza border is not expected, and at most there will be an attempt by a handful of terrorists to infiltrate Israel, and that does not require a large force. Binyamin Netanyahu rejected the Chief of Staff's demand and informed Major General Herzi Halevi that, following the words of the defense minister, the government will not approve a budget for the 18 battalions required by the IDF.

Why did the Prime Minister agree to split the dialogue with the IDF between the Operations Division and the Intelligence Division?

Why does the Intelligence Division have independent communication with the Prime Minister, over the head of Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi?

Did the Prime Minister conduct the IDF in accordance with his well-known political behavior patterns – "divide and rule" – and separate the Operations Division from the Intelligence Division?

Who was the Prime Minister who received from the Chief of Staff the original demand of the Operations Division?

These and other questions will have to be answered by the State Commission of Inquiry, if the Israeli government fails to thwart its establishment.

On the morning of the attack, a conversation took place between Chief of Staff Halevi and Prime Minister Netanyahu. At the heart of this conversation was the shared concern that this was a simultaneous attack from the south and the north. The two apparently decided by agreement that forces should not be immediately sent to the south, so that if Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards attacked in the north, the IDF could thwart the attack. This is the reason why concentrated IDF forces were not sent to the south for many hours, and remained on alert in the central region in case The government and the Chief of Staff will order them to go north. We do not know if any part of these forces even received an order to go up immediately after the said conversation to the north, or if the entire force, including aircraft that did not participate in the "silence" – waited for the order that would come after the lengthy discussions that took place that morning in Kriya.