Until Saturday, Hezbollah did not respond to Prime Minister Lapid's move in the middle of the week to reject Lebanon's claims outright. On Saturday, the organization sent a weak response, encapsulated in an unofficial article, in Al Manar, saying "this is a psychological war". On Saturday night, the TV station distributed a slide detailing the changes requested by Lebanon, as if to say see how simple and easy it is, why postpone? The decisive move by the prime minister apparently caused an equal distribution of the fear of war between him and Nasrallah and reduced the confidence of the head of Hezbollah; The organization probably remembers how it exceeded the limits of its power in 2006, and even then, for the same reason of interpreting Israel's deep fear of war as a military weakness; The event ended in 2006 with destruction in the Dahiya district of Beirut. Yesterday, Defense Minister Benny Gantz told Channel 12 News that if Hezbollah's provocation develops into an all-out war, "we will dismantle Lebanon." Whether this is a psychological war or whether it is true or perhaps both, this sentence will undoubtedly deepen the discussion inside Nasrallah's bunker, at least to the extent that it takes place in “Habor” in Tel Aviv.

The organization that heads the parliamentary political bloc in Lebanon now has several options. One, to start a war, for example with a direct and successful attack on the oil rig in the Karish field and risk an all-out response by Israel in the spirit of 2006, in Lebanon and probably in Syria as well; A comprehensive response in the sense that all options will be on the table, as we reported here about a month ago. Another option, to hold a harmless demonstration operation, hoping that Israel's reaction will be minor, and then try to return to the negotiations and moderate Lebanon's position. A third option, to quietly withdraw from Lebanon's comment paper by proposing an alternative deal to the American mediator Hochstein. And another possibility, to continue the current tensions and the walk on the brink, until the next government in Israel, and risk negotiations with Netanyahu to which Al Manar referred, by saying that Netanyahu is the real reason why Lapid rejected Lebanon's comments outright. It was written here last week that Netanyahu's words added deterrence towards Hezbollah; The organization's silence may indicate that Netanyahu's message has indeed permeated his leadership. On the other hand, since Nasrallah has bound himself to attack Israel, any behavior that is not an attack towards the gas rig in the Karish field, will oblige him to provide his lovers and his enemies with a convoluted explanation. Can Nasrallah forgive his honor and still avoid a military response? The answer is probably positive: although the head of Hezbollah often presents a hot-headed side to his personality, he also has a strong rational side, and it is estimated that he does not want war now.