In recent months, Hamas has come to the conclusion that the Islamic Jihad intends to do to Hamas, what Hamas did to Fatah after the second intifada that began in 2000, when Hamas strengthened militarily, became very strong on the street, defeated Fatah in the parliamentary elections in 2006, and at the height of its power in 2007, at the end of the intifada Second, it removed Fatah from power in the Gaza Strip, and took its place as sovereign in the Gaza Strip. An important Palestinian source told us this week that the entire doctrine of Hamas is based on these events, in which, from its point of view, it defeated Fatah through its positions and military power, thus changing the image of internal control and the de jure representation of the Palestinian people.
Due to the direct support of Iran and Hezbollah in the Islamic Jihad, the extreme Islamic movement became very strong, and began to operate separately from Hamas in the Gaza Strip and even more so in the West Bank. A source in the Palestinian Authority told us this week that "suddenly the jihad stopped understanding that it was operating under the auspices of Hamas and began to think that it was operating on the side of Hamas." This recognition among the leadership of Hamas led the movement to decide on weakening the power of the Islamic Jihad. This decision created a temporary identity of interests between Fatah and Hamas. This decision by Hamas to weaken the power of the Jihad contradicted the decision of Iran and Hezbollah to strengthen the Jihad and Hamas, as separate movements, without recognizing the hegemony of Hamas over the Jihad. This Iranian Lebanese behavior led to tension between Hamas and Iran and Hezbollah. In our estimation, for now Iranian support for Hamas has not waned, even though Hamas has demonstrated independence towards Iran and Hezbollah.
Following Hamas's decision to weaken the jihad, the organization was involved in handing over the head of the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank to Israel, an event which led to a conflict between Israel and the jihad, and in the eyes of Hamas, the weakening of the jihad. If the Jihad does not accept the message of Hamas, according to the words of the Palestinian source, further clashes between the two movements are expected. Hamas thereby made it clear to Iran, Lebanon and the Islamic Jihad that further operations of the Jihad in the Gaza Strip can only be under the auspices of Hamas as sovereign in the Gaza Strip, as an organization that won the majority of votes in the parliamentary elections in 2006, and with its approval.
Regarding the Tanzim assassination of the head of Hamas in the West Bank about a month ago, which we reported here exclusively and extensively, the source told us that the Tanzim clarified to Hamas after the assassination that it was a local private initiative of a Tanzim activist, and the Tanzim as an organization has nothing to do with it. This clarification, and the identity of the interests of weakening the jihad, created a temporary relaxation in the fundamental tension between Hamas and Fatah in recent weeks, the source said, but the fundamental disagreements have not changed.