Israel’s deterrent capability has grown since October 7, and its firepower—largely the product of Israeli technological developments—signals that in the balance of wartime successes, Israel holds the lead over Iran and the "Islamo-Nazi" axis that set out to destroy it on October 7. However, in terms of the internal Israeli imperative—which has existed since the dawn of modern Israeli history—to decisively defeat the enemy so that it remembers its defeat for years to come, Israel has not won the war against Iran. It would have been better had Israel destroyed Iran’s oil and gas production facilities back in January 2024—when Hamas had been defeated and the world stood by Israel’s side—including demolishing Kharg Island and imposing a total Israeli naval and aerial blockade on Iran until it relinquished its nuclear program, including its enriched uranium. Yet Israel failed to do so, allowing Turkey to enter the arena and initiate a process with Iran to establish an "Islamo-Nazi" political axis that seeks to rule the Middle East and threatens annihilation. The argument that Iran has not yet been defeated—and must be—may serve the government as it seeks to wage an endless war; however, in our assessment, there is no longer a way to decisively defeat Iran in this round. First, Turkey covertly safeguards Iranian interests while deceiving the US President and Europe; one method of deceiving Europe is by emphasizing its vital role in NATO’s military structure—particularly now, as Russia threatens Britain. The Turkish-Iranian military-Islamic worldview stands in stark contrast to European military perspectives, which are rooted in the lessons of World War II and the imperative of restraint. President Erdoğan long ago abandoned the imperative of restraint—which had somewhat linked Turkey to Europe, as embodied in the Atatürk doctrine—transforming instead into a modern-day Saladin who dreams of a culminating Battle of Hattin (a pursuit for which he is cultivating a relationship with the Sino-Russian axis, to which he feels culturally and ideologically close). Erdogan could obtain it from Israel only if the IDF dedicates the coming years to rebuilding its strength—fielding 9,000 modern tanks, integrating women and the ultra-Orthodox into service, and sealing the border from Eilat to Tzemach without neglecting the Golan Heights or the tri-border area. Furthermore, it would require a coastal defense force prepared to confront a Turkish amphibious invasion fleet—and perhaps even the new Chinese ambition to rapidly deploy ships into the Mediterranean via the port alliances China has forged with Egypt and Turkey (as well as with Israel, which, in our assessment, ought to initiate a process to oust China from the Haifa port and the Ashdod port projects; diplomatic clarity will play a decisive role in the struggle against deceptive powers like the Turkish and Chinese axes). Secondly, Israel has tethered its strength to President Donald Trump—a man for whom the idiom "a broken reed" fits like a tailored suit; Trump cannot, and likely does not wish to, subdue Iran. Yet, defeating Iran or securing a nuclear agreement with it is vital for Israel’s survival. In this context, the direct negotiations Israel held with Iran about two weeks ago—mediated by Qatar—regarding the Ali Taher ridge carry profound diplomatic significance; however, the Israeli government did not disclose these negotiations or their outcome (soldiers were released from a bunker, and the IDF blew up the ridge). In doing so, it once again prolongs the war—instead of utilizing the window of opportunity that opened to end the conflict and focus on rebuilding the IDF into a strong, self-assured force, at least on par with its state following October 8, 2023. Looking ahead to next year—and to highlight the IDF’s role in saving an Israel that continues to slide into an abyss of socio-cultural and political rot and corruption—we may consider naming Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi our newspaper’s "Man of the Year." This would be in recognition of his success in restoring the IDF to full strength shortly after it had plunged into the kind of abyss it has faced twice before in Israel’s military history: in 1973 and 2023. Selecting Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir as "Man of the Year" for 2026, alongside the high regard in which Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi is held, could spare us all from having to chronicle the next "Islamo-Nazi" surprise attack orchestrated by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Naturally, this also depends on the establishment of the Arab-Israeli axis conceived in Ramallah—a development we have previously reported on here; further details regarding this Arab-Israeli axis can be found in today’s diary and editorial.