Commentary: Egyptian Deception Exercise October 1973
Palestinian Deception Exercise October 2023
Iranian Turkish Deception Exercise 2025 and Beyond
The commander of the Iranian Navy (the Navy of the Iranian Army, not the Revolutionary Guards) announced this week a naval exercise in which unnamed "neighbouring countries" will take part. The manner of expression indicates an exercise that will reach as far as "oceanic regions," a hint at Yemen and the Horn of Africa and Somalia (it is worth checking in the field security arena how the commander of the Iranian Navy spoke about the Somaliland region almost simultaneously with the Israeli recognition of the country that separated from Somalia). In the Iranian manner of expression, there is an implicit threat of the appearance of Iranian warships in the Mediterranean Sea in an exercise with Turkey; We emphasize that this was not explicitly stated, but it is implied by the phrase "neighbouring countries," and by the emphasis that the exercise will be conducted "in neighbouring countries" and not "with neighbouring countries," without naming them. The Iranian Navy commander's words coincide with the words of the (moderate) Iranian president, according to which the country is at war with Israel. Since Iran is a defeated country, and its ability to prohibit war on Israel and the US is deeply in doubt, and since it no longer has the power (for now) to add the Iranian nuclear program to its threats, our assessment is that the threats, coordinated with Turkey, may have been coordinated with Foreign Minister Fidan's visit to Iran about a month ago, a Foreign Minister who, according to the nature of the current Turkish regime, serves as a kind of Minister of War; the Iranian move comes at the same time as an Iranian announcement in a government newspaper (which was quoted here last week) according to which Turkish President Erdogan may visit Iran. In our assessment, the purpose of the publications (including the Turkish ones, which we will detail later in the article) is to divert Israel's attention from Turkey's strengthening along Israel's borders, to the distant Persian Gulf and Iran, and even further afield, to Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Investing Israeli resources in the Horn of Africa could cause the Israeli security establishment to go into a state of dormancy. In the Golan Heights, Lebanon, and perhaps even surrender to President Trump in the Gaza Strip in exchange for a second joint attack on Iran. This means that Israel may agree to the entry of the Turkish army into Gaza, an event that would, in our assessment, lead to a regional war, with a country with a large amount of Armor and experience in armoured warfare, while the Israeli armoured corps has not yet been restored, after Benjamin Netanyahu reduced it, in violation of the law (see our series of investigations on the destruction of the armoured corps, June-August 2023). Israel's attention, which is currently focused on Turkey in the Syrian and Lebanese arenas, led to an attack on a post that Turkey established in cooperation with Russia in Beit Jen in the Quneitra region on Hezbollah infrastructure; Israel attacked the outpost very close to its establishment, an attack that slowed Turkey's expansion in Syria and the Golan Heights, including (slowing down) the supply of weapons that it intends to provide to the Syrian army; the assumption that the outpost was in its infancy allows both sides to publicly ignore the attack and leave it out of public attention, see our publication here on Turkey's intention to provide Syria with drones and missiles; the Turkish news agency Anadolu, this week, expressed outrage over the "attack on Quneitra" without specifying the nature of the attack and the exact scene of the attack. The agency's report also expressed subdued outrage over the "attack on a mosque in Homs." In Homs, let us recall, there was a large Hezbollah military infrastructure (an infrastructure that it received from Iran, as we published here exclusively in the past). In exchange for the infrastructure Turkey received from Hezbollah in the Golan Heights, President Erdogan recently warned Syria not to harm Hezbollah in Syria as well as in Lebanon (see our exclusive article on Erdogan's warning, TIPP archive, previous issues).
By Mati Cohen
The heart of the Iranian-Turkish diversion, modeled on the Egyptian-Syrian diversion of 1973, is, in our assessment, the danger of transferring Iranian military nuclear technology to Turkey, and especially the transfer of all the research progress that Iran has made (and the extent of which we do not know), in the technology of assembling nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles. Turkish President Erdogan has not ruled out in the past that Turkey will acquire nuclear weapons, and recently even signed a mining agreement with an African country rich in minerals, including a large uranium mine; at the same time, Erdogan inaugurated the country's first nuclear power plant. In this context, it is possible to assume that the West's response to a Turkish nuclear weapon will be more moderate than its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, due to Turkey's influence in Europe, due to Turkey's long European history, which has created deterrence on both sides, and due to Turkey's membership in NATO. Israel is therefore likely to stand alone in the arena of a Turkish nuclear weapon, a reality that could prevent it from having any possibility of preventing Turkey from deploying nuclear weapons in the regional arena. Mainly due to the US's almost unreserved support for Turkey, given global developments and the developing danger of a third world war.
In the maritime arena, Turkey has already conducted a joint exercise with Egypt, in what appears to be a sign of the nature of Turkish naval military operations, in cooperation with allied countries; therefore, a naval exercise with Iran is within the realm of possibility and logic.
In the first hint of an IDF attack on a post that Turkey tried to establish in the Quneitra area (in Beit Jen), the Anadolu news agency this week criticized the IDF attack in the Quneitra area, and this is what Anadolu wrote about it: "According to the Syrian state news agency SANA, Israeli forces shelled the Tal al-Ahmar al-Sharqi area in southern Quneitra on Friday. Earlier this week, Israeli forces also fired at civilians near three villages in the area. These attacks reflect a pattern of ongoing Israeli violations, according to Damascus”. We note that the distance between the Turkish-Russian outpost that was attacked by the air force in the Beit Jen area and the site of the attack in Tel al-Ahmar is about 35 kilometers; it is even possible that one of the villages mentioned in the report is Beit Jen, in the vicinity of which the outpost was established. Anadolu added that Turkey protested the attack on a mosque in the Homs area. We say that the Homs area is home to a very extensive Hezbollah military infrastructure, in which the organization that intended to destroy Israel had missiles and drones.
Our assessment is therefore that Erdogan's warning to President al-Shara not to attack Hezbollah is a reward that Turkey gave to Hezbollah for the military infrastructure it received from Hezbollah in Syria, in the Golan Heights.
The news in Anadolu clearly expresses the Turkish need to cool Israel down in the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and the Iranian exercise to divert Israeli attention to the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa makes sense, and as mentioned, even relies on the regional heritage cited in our headline above.