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20.11.2022

Editorial

Abu Mazen and Hamas on honeymoon

עיתון בין אויבים

A newspaper among enemies

Abu Mazen's external interest in starting negotiations with Hamas now, is the presentation of Israel as a peace refuser, and the presentation of the expected coalition of Netanyahu and Deri with Ben Gvir and Smotrich, as threatening not only the Palestinians by perpetuating the occupation, but it even threatens Israeli democracy, i.e., threatens the western wind that the USA carries its flag. The Palestinian president understands this threat of Ben Gvir and Smotrich to Israeli democracy better than Israeli media, and Israeli publicists. America also understands this better than them, and expresses its wisdom openly as well as behind the scenes. Abu Mazen was apparently convinced that a process of rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas, which may express to the Western world an inner Palestinian peace, in complete contrast of course to the real thing that is happening in the Palestinian public, which is complete political chaos and disturbed power struggles, may bring him two important achievements: One is to bring America a small but significant step closer to the Palestinians, and the other is to help him complete the course of determining the face of the Palestinian leadership after his retirement.

Determining the face of the Palestinian leadership after him, is the deep and true internal interest of Abu Mazen when he began the process of reconciliation with Hamas last month, and this interest is not at all related to Israel, nor to the expected extreme coalition, but to the desire of the Palestinian president to complete the process of crowning Hussein al-Sheikh After him or at least determine a leader who will be agreed upon, a leader who will replace him in Mukta'a in the PLO and Fatah.

Abu Mazen wants al-Sheikh in his place, but he has apparently conclude that without Hamas he will not be able to dominate his will, in light of the all-out war that has started within the Fatah movement since he made this intention clear. On the other hand, Abu Mazen realized that in the new reality that was created with the entry of Iran and Hezbollah through jihad into the West Bank, Hamas will now be ready to negotiate, and he was right. The Hamas movement now needs Abu Mazen to back it up against those trying to diminish it, no less than Abu Mazen now needs Hamas to back him up against those trying to diminish him. Hamas is not extreme enough in the eyes of Iran, Hezbollah, and Jihad, And the three are challenging its place in the Palestinian public, and mainly they are undermining the military position of Hamas, in their currently unsuccessful attempt to establish a new radical Islamic force in the West Bank, and in their attempt to push Hamas from its position as the leader of the military side in the struggle against Israel. Abu Mazen struck while the iron was hot, and the two leading movements in the Palestinian public are now negotiating in Gaza.

The chance that they will be able to reach a constitutive agreement is slim. Abu Mazen wants Hamas to join the PLO as a movement under the auspices of Fatah, while Hamas wants Abu Mazen to recognize the far-reaching implications of its victory in the parliamentary elections in 2006. The two conflicting desires have not reached a balance so far, and the chances are slim that they will now.

But the chance that the parties will reach a partial agreement this time regarding the Palestinian public status quo, that is, Hamas' control of Gaza with the backing of the PLO, and Abu Mazen's control of the Palestinian Authority with the backing of Hamas, or the ratification of this reality, this chance certainly exists. Such an agreement will pave al-Sheikh's path to the Mukta'a, and will put an end to the dreams of Rajoub, Tirawi and Barghouti, at least until the time of al-Sheikh's coronation. In that case, the jihad will also receive another defeat, in addition to the one it already received from Israel in the summer, after Hamas brought about the extradition of the leader of the West Bank movement to Israel in the summer, the extradition which led to the IDF operation against the jihad in Gaza.