Early this morning (Sunday, August 14), Palestinian-Iranian terrorism claimed another dose of Israeli blood. This attack, even if it turns out that the terrorist belongs to a different Palestinian organization or is he a "lone terrorist" is inspired by the new terrorist strategy behind the Iranian Lebanese-Palestinian effort to create a new bloody axis against Israel, an axis that starts in Tehran, moves to Beirut, and completes the circle in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Gaza is designated by the strategy of Hamas and Iran, which we reported here in the past, to leave temporarily out of the picture, for it to become stronger, perfected, and strengthened, and become a real conflict state and a military political base. This act of terrorism in the Old City of Jerusalem, in which 8 people were injured, is a direct continuation of the recent developments between Tanzim-Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad:
Circumstantial information that has come to us indicates that the Fatah movement knew about a week before the clash between the IDF and Jihad (in Operation Dawn) that something significant was about to happen. Beyond the question of where Fatah knew, which we will try to answer later, it was said that the question of whether Fatah is working with or against Israel can be determined by the answer to whether Fatah passed on information to Israel about what was expected to happen or kept the information from Israel. We do not know the answer to that. We know that Israel deviated from the norm this time and attacked Jihad in a pre-emptive attack. Did Israel know in advance that Hamas would not join the fighting, since Fatah informed it? Is Fatah playing a double game in the new terror arena?
Fatah could not have known that something significant might happen in the local arena, and that radical Islam would be involved in it, without having a new and significant connection to Hamas and radical Islam. Three weeks ago, we reported on Fatah's assassination of the head of Hamas in the West Bank, Nasr Aladin al-Sha'ar (see the photo of his car after the assassination). This was an exclusive report, and as far as we know no media outlets have quoted or repeated our report. The Palestinians silenced the story of the assassination, but Israel did not publish anything about it either. Palestinian silencing can only be done by the Palestinian Authority or the Fatah movement in the centralized Palestinian government culture. So far, we do not know what happened after the assassination of Nasser Aladin al-Sha'ar, but we know that a war did not start between Hamas and Fatah, and just as Hamas did not join the jihad war with Israel, Hamas also did not start a war with Fatah. This behavior once again points to a rigid, clear, and focused strategy, which so far has not characterized Hamas. The source of this new strategy is Iran, and Hamas' close relationship with Iran, both of which we have reported extensively here, including the sophisticated ways in which Iranian money is transferred to Hamas; This strategy includes moving the center of gravity of terrorist extremist Islam from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, also to allow Gaza to strengthen and become a real conflict state.
All of this suggests the possibility that Hamas and Fatah found a way after the assassination in al Sha'ar to return to negotiations and cooperate. This is how Fatah knew what was about to happen. Fatah realized that Hamas's strategy leaves Jihad out of the picture. And again, it is not clear if Israel were informed of the moves, since if it was, it knew in advance that Hamas would not join the fighting if it was, which explains its confident tactic of launching a pre-emptive attack in Gaza.
Last week we wrote that in our opinion the arrest of the head of the Jihad in the West Bank was due to a tip-off by a Palestinian organization, and we did not specify who in our opinion did the tip-off. It is possible that the informing came from Fatah and Hamas together. So that jihad cannot torpedo the rapprochement between them, and the renewal they are apparently talking about. Negotiations between Fatah and Hamas already took place about two months ago and we reported on it. al-Sha'ar spoke in this negotiation on behalf of Hamas. The negotiation was stopped after Fatah concluded that Hamas was talking to it as a ruler and not as a partner. As those who intend to take over the representation of the Palestinians instead of the PLO, and not as those who want to take part. Therefore, it is not impossible that the negotiations were renewed, despite the assassination of al-Sha'ar, and perhaps the assassination even contributed to it.
Hamas is in a strategic relationship with Iran. As part of the axis that Iran has established against Israel, Hezbollah's moves concerning Hamas are visible to it. A Palestinian source told us about a regular movement of extremist Islam activists from the PA territories to Jordan and from there via Syria to Lebanon. This physical connection sharpens the ties of Palestinian extremist Islam with Hezbollah and Iran, and attests to them. Strengthening Gaza as a political entity, and perhaps even as a conflict state in the future, is part of this strategy of moving the center of terrorism to the West Bank.
Bad cop Nasrallah singled out the month of September as a possible date for a confrontation with Israel. Very close to his words, the Palestinians, including Fatah, closed all contact with journalists, to the point of a complete curfew of dialogue with Israelis. What do they know this time, and has Israel been updated? We know that Hezbollah, which plays the role of the bad cop in the Iranian regional game, points the finger at Israel in the updates it delivers to the residents of Israel in Al Manar. You can see the threatening wave in the attached screenshot. To the finger-wagging, Nasrallah is currently adding threats to the Lebanese who are negotiating with Israel that they will not conclude a deal without a clear victory for Lebanon. Although Israel apparently submitted a far-reaching proposal that, while leaving the Karish gas field in its hands, transfers another maritime space to Lebanon. Hizbullah is waiting for the good cop, Iran, and for the decision whether to put out the fire it inspired or ignite it; Iran, on the other hand, in its role as the good cop, said this week that the satellite launched in its name from Russia is only for civilian purposes, for example agriculture: The good cop Iran is waiting for the West's decision in Vienna, and whether the West will grant it victory in the nuclear talks. If the West grants Iran a victory, Lebanon will most likely accept Israel's offer.

On Friday (August 12) it was published in the Iranian press that, according to Iran, the West gave it an ultimatum to close a deal immediately. The headline of the news threatened that the European bet could endanger the talks. Iran wants to get better terms, so it wants to keep the Hizbullah sword pointed at Israel at least until the month of September. Israel, on the other hand, wants to separate Hezbollah from Iran and the talks in Vienna to control the threat to it. This is probably the source of the West's ultimatum towards Iran: Israel's pressure in response to Hezbollah's threats. Hezbollah's threat depends on progress in Vienna. Hamas is informed about this, and probably Fatah as well. If Israel is updated, then a new era will open between it and Hamas, or are the Palestinians preparing a trap for Israel? They provide her with partial information to gain her trust and hide the more significant information about Iran and Hezbollah's September plans. In any case, if Israel does not know, it is in for a surprise from both Hamas, and Hezbollah, and possibly Fatah as well. Unless Israel behaves with Hezbollah and Hamas as it behaved about a week ago with the Jihad and strikes them as a pre-emptive strike as soon as the talks in Vienna fail. And it should be said that before the West's ultimatum to Iran, Iran found in the West's proposals a positive political quality that allows it to examine the proposals seriously.