The control center of Gush Etzion informed the residents at the end of the week that they must prepare for the matriculation test scores that will be given in the coming days to the youth in the Palestinian villages; According to the announcement, the giving of grades to Palestinian youth is accompanied every year by shots in the air and fireworks therefore, the creators of the announcement believed that the public should be prepared for this. The announcement clarifies the political view towards Palestinian culture: they do it this way, we do not do it that way, and vice versa.
In the absence of a cultural dialogue between the Palestinian public and the Israeli public, there is no way to check what are the cultural characteristics in each of the civilizations, which violate the peace of mind of the opposite culture. It is called consideration, not politics. For example, not to shoot every night in the ears of the residents of the Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood in Jerusalem and not to prevent them from sleeping. Do not uproot olive trees and in general anything planted. Do not call the believers to come to prayer with a terrible loudspeaker. It is possible to lower it, without it being considered a political act.
Why is there no culture-based discourse? For several reasons, one of them is that there is no public in Israeli publicism. There are parties, there is a political press, and there are other things, but there is no public. Once every four years, or once a year lately, the elements of the public emerge for two minutes of publicity, and it again disintegrates into nine million political entities right after the vote. The public has been absent from the Israeli publicism since the dawn of Israel's rise, more precisely since the dawn of the return of Zion in about 1850.
Israel rose on a red party register. In the first years of its establishment, there was no event that took place without having a party identity. The public identity was also drained into the governing political identity, and only in 1977 was it divided into several political identities. Since the cultural identity was Ashkenazi, since the eastern identity was deprived of political recognition, it can be said that the Israeli political identity is Ashkenazi. And this is how it will probably be until the Israeli public emerges from its darkened place into an establishment that is Israeli publicism, and in it will re-establish Israel as the Israeli society, and not as a collection of subjects of political parties whose culture is mostly exclusively Ashkenazi. By the way, the ultra-orthodox public tried at the dawn of the revival to develop a life for itself other than the all-political life, and this to be a public, and not a party, or not a collection of political people, and it failed. It became clear to them that their foundations are also no different from the culture brought from Russia, according to which every movement has a political tone, and the public and the government are one.
But the political parties are not the public, nor do they express the will of the public despite the popular legend. The political parties express their will, which they identify with the will of the public. Sometimes, maybe even – most of the time, the party interest contradicts the public interest, but we have no real public way to determine this, simply because there is no public within the public framework, there are parties there. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu, on the one hand the law is on his side, and he is allowed to be elected prime minister. His political supporters support the law. His opponents, on the other hand, destroy the central feature of Israeli democracy, on which they themselves rely at least in their statements, a law enacted by the Knesset, and they have great arguments for their undemocratic position. There is no justice in it, or in the opposite position, because justice in the public case is the will and value decision of the Israeli public, but what is this will, and what is this value decision? The Netanyahu case is so important and influential, to the extent that it brought destruction to the Israeli political order, and it even endangers Israel in a social sense; And in the social sense, in our special case, as we all know, there are also security aspects.
This week, two officials from the prosecutor's office, both of whom did it a week apart, collided in Israel's television studio. They said harsh things about each other, but we have no way of knowing what the public truth is, since the only truth that exists within us is the political truth. On the social networks, the tongues were fired from both sides, some took official A under their protection, and others took official B. The serious things said by both sides became political fuel. If there was an Israeli public within the framework of the Israeli public, he would perhaps clarify to all of us what was said, according to his best judgment, and what of all this would remain as a value lesson within the Israeli publicism. Of course, the right of opposition and debate would have been preserved for every person, but this right would have entered the right context, and no speaker would have seen their words as the living words of God as they do now. A little modesty never hurt any country or society.
Or if you take a case from the past that also featured a legal figure, when Supreme Court President Aharon Barak recognized the void left by the absence of the Israeli public from the Israeli publicism, and his determination led to the fact that the role that should have been assigned to the public if only he was present, was transferred to the line of the criminal roles of the court, and from the moment Barak delivered his words, everything became worthy of being a legal case in court. So, it should be said that indeed everything should come to trial, but the expectation in value cases is for the public's opinion, and not for the Supreme Court's opinion, whose role is to enact a trial according to the law.
Or, for example, the Ashkenazi racial attack against the East, which is the main driver of the all-political Israeli public. This attack is the foundation and motive for public behavior, and electoral behavior, and party behavior which replaces the public within the publicism. And the current party political system not only does not bring reconciliation between the ethnic groups, but parties even deny the very existence of the Ashkenazi racial attack against the East from the dawn of the revival until today. And so, there is no way to rule in a public sense what and how and when it happened, and how we got to the current point, that is, to a flawed and biased electoral system due to sectarian motives, and it is no longer possible to bring about reconciliation between the ethnic communities, which is so necessary and historic, and which will stop the most essential danger to Israel's existence. The danger of social division.
Therefore, the Israeli political structure, which is a party structure, must be changed. and to establish an upper house, an upper elected house next to the Knesset, whose representatives will be elected by the community, for the sake of the revival of the Israeli public, and not only for the sake of the revival of the Israeli state as it happened, and each of the elected will stand for his judgment as an elected official for the establishment of the Israeli public and its authentic pluralistic culture, and not like an elected official of a political agenda. And the upper house, which will be next to the Knesset as mentioned, will be Israel's value authority, on whose value basis the Knesset will enact its laws, and it will also be the arm of the public to govern its public systems in the value sense: In the legal system, in the political system, in the press, and also in the violent police that disperse protesting Israelis with horses, and this publicity, among all its duties, will also drain once and for all the swarms of violent political poison on social networks. This house can be called Beit Atseret Am